

International Migration and the Disaster of Internationalisation: An Assessment of Nigeria's Foreign Policy in the Global Age

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Abstract

Global migration of people, goods and other natural forces has become a recurrent and popular decimal in the contemporary international system. This made the world a global village that brings everybody in the world together under one opportunity and one peril. The implication of this is that whatever affects one part of the world positively or negatively naturally affects other areas of the world. This made an investigation into the dynamics of international migration and the disaster of internationalisation, particularly as it affects Nigeria in the global age noteworthy. Nigeria has been a victim of several international disasters among which is the 2012 flood disaster that emanated from the Republic of Cameroon. Nigeria's subscription to certain international treaties and obligations has also engendered several disasters among which is the continual erosion of State sovereignty, the Nigerian civil war and the recent upsurge of secessionist struggles, the latest of whose is the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-East and South-South parts of the country, Boko Haram insurgency and herders/farmers crises in the northern part of the country. The study adopted the qualitative method of research. The data of the study was collected from secondary sources such as published materials, internet documents and other unpublished sources. The study adopted the theory of linkage politics to explain the linkage between domestic realities and international issues. The study revealed that there are possibilities of mutual coexistence between Nigeria and her neighbours, but efforts must be intensified to ensure that the border and territorial integrity of the country is preserved.

Keywords: International; Migration; Internationalisation; Disaster; Foreign Policy.

Introduction

The world has become a borderless society. Trans – border migration and the associated consequences is on the increase. That is, what affects one end automatically affects other ends of the globe. For instance, Fukushima disaster largely focused on the northeast of Japan and the surrounding seas, the effects thereof were experienced in Hawaii, the Philippines, Pacific Island nations, and the Pacific coast of the Americas, occasioning the damage to ports and coastal settlements (Mackie, 2014). With the global nature of opportunities and perils, efforts at delinking being proposed by some scholars, particularly those of the global south may not be realistic. The internationalisation of disaster has become inevitable as a result of the inter-border linkages of certain natural phenomena. For instance, Rivers Benue and Niger that pass-through Nigeria do not originate from Nigeria; it therefore means that any disaster emanating from any of these rivers have some repercussion on Nigeria. The opening of the Lagbo Dam in Cameroon in 2012 led to massive flooding in Nigeria that unleashed untold hardship on Nigeria and Nigerians following the unprecedented loss of lives and destruction of properties across many states in Nigeria.

Besides, the upsurge of insurgencies across the globe is noteworthy. As Peter & Asogwa (2010) opine, the proliferation of transnational organised crime is as a result of the growth and expansion of globalisation. A core type of insurgencies, particularly as it affects Nigeria and her immediate neighbours is the Boko Haram insurgency. Originating from a small enclave in Maduguri, the Borno State Capital, it later spread to other parts of the state, other states in Nigeria and Abuja– the Federal Capital Territory, and subsequently the neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad Republic, among others. This has recently attracted global attention on the need for adequate counter–insurgency approach as a means of containing this menace. Parts of the disasters of internationalisation are the rising spate of money laundering. Some countries have been safe haven for the keeping of ill–gotten wealth by dubious citizens. This justifies the possibilities of unpatriotic people to negatively collaborate to defraud the country. Nigeria has suffered from this scenario in the past few years – leading to the rise of the country to high scale on corruption and looting of public treasuries.

As a key player in the affairs of the West African sub – region for instance, Nigeria is party to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on Free Movement of persons and goods across the borders of countries within the sub–region. As good as this may sound in boosting integration and cooperation among the peoples and countries of the sub–region, there are also evidences of trans border criminalities

engendered by the window of opportunities provided by the Protocol on Free Movement and Persons and Goods. It is hoped that adequate surveillance can be done to minimise the negative effect of international disasters on Nigeria and other countries within the international milieu. Adequate positive collaboration between the countries in the international system, like the formation of the Multilateral Joint Task Force in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency, positive engagement of civil society organisation, among others can help in positively mitigating the internationalisation of disaster.

Research Methodology and Data Used

The study adopted the qualitative method of research. The qualitative method involves the collection of extensive narrative data in order to gain insights into phenomena of interest. The data were gotten from secondary sources such as published materials, unpublished materials, working papers, and internet sources. The data collected was subjected to qualitative technique of analysis. It focussed on Nigeria's experience between 2009 and 2018. This period encompasses some notable milestones in Nigeria, such as, the violent campaign lunched against the Nigerian State by the Boko Haram insurgent group following the killing of its leader in 2009, the 2011 general elections with its attendant loss of lives and unprecedented destruction of properties, the flood disaster of 2012 following the massive rain fall and the release of water from the Cameroonian Lagbo Dam, the 2015 general elections with the accompanying uncertainties, and the 2017/2018 escalation of herders/farmers and other communal crises. Some of the issues surrounding these issues were carefully isolated and discussed.

Study Area

Nigeria was a British colony prior to October 1st 1960 when it was declared an independent country, hence gaining the status of statehood and opportunity to assert her sovereignty. Nigeria is a Federal Republic bordering Benin in the west, Chad and Cameroon in the east, and Niger in the north. Its coast in the south lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean. The country currently comprises of 36 states with Abuja serving as the Federal Capital Territory. Though the 2006 population and housing census of Nigeria puts her population at 140 million, recent estimates put Nigeria's population at 190,632,261 (CIA, 2018) making her the most populous black nation in the world. Nigeria is rich in natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, and arable land. Figure1 is the map of Nigeria showing its major components, and the bordering countries. Nigeria is a Federal Republic with the presidential system of government. The President who is both the head of state and the government is elected for tenure of four years and could be re-elected for a second term of four years.




Figure 1: The map of Nigeria showing the states and the bordering countries

The achievement of independence on October 1st 1960 marked the beginning of a major dramatic and paradoxical political journey of Nigeria. The political elites that took over from the colonialists quickly adopted the Westminster system of parliamentary system of government with the head of state performing ceremonial functions and were then referred to as the Governor General and the Prime Minister performing the real

executive functions of government. The immediate post-independence political scenario reflected some sort of ethnically divided political organizations. Essentially, the post-independence political parties of Nigeria were formed to defend the existing primordial arrangement of religion, ethnicity and regionalism. On this basis, the NPC (Nigerian People's Congress) represented the conservative, Muslim; largely Hausa interests, and dominated the Northern Region. The NCNC (National Convention of Nigerian Citizens) was Igbo- and Christian-dominated, ruling in the Eastern Region, and the AG (Action Group) was a left-leaning party that controlled the Yoruba west. The first post-independence National Government was formed by a conservative alliance of the NCNC and the NPC, with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Hausa, becoming Nigeria's first Prime Minister. The Yorubadominated AG became the opposition under its charismatic leader Chief Obafemi Awolowo (cited in Peter, 2012).

In the bid for the institutionalisation of purely domestic system of governance, Nigeria proclaimed itself the Federal Republic of Nigeria in October 1963 with the former Governor General (Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe) becoming Nigeria's first President. The first republic was bedevilled with untold ethnic and religious tensions heightened "by the disparities in economic and educational development between the south and the north" (Peter, 2012). The political manoeuvring of the first republic that has continued with the three major ethnic groups perpetually engaged on means of edging out one another. The political instability engendered by this development has been partly responsible for the spate of ethno-religious crises that have bedeviled the country. This scenario was a major factor in the successive military interventions in the politics of Nigeria between 1966 and 1999 when Nigeria finally returned to the path of democratic governance. In the build up to the presidential elections that ushered in the current Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) fielded a former military Head of State, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) who was freed from prison by the Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar's military government, the alliance of All People's Party (APP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD) fielded Chief Olu Falae. Both Obasanjo and Falae hailed from the South Western geo-political zone of the country, the area that produced the assumed winner of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election, Chief M. K. O. Abiola. At the end of the 1999 general elections, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP was declared the winner and returned elected thereby setting the stage for the commencement of the fourth republic on May 29, 1999. The Provisional Ruling Council promulgated a new constitution based largely on the suspended 1979 constitution, before the May 29, 1999 inauguration of the new civilian President. The constitution includes provisions for a bicameral legislature, the National Assembly consisting of a 360-member House of Representatives and a 109-member Senate.

The emergence of democracy in Nigeria on May 1999 ended the 16 years of consecutive military misrule. The new President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo inherited a country suffering from economic stagnation and the deterioration of most democratic institutions. He, a former General, was admired for his stand against the Abacha dictatorship, his record of returning the Federal Government to civilian rule in 1979 and his claim to represent all Nigerians regardless of religion. The new President took over a country that faced many problems, including a dysfunctional bureaucracy, collapsed infrastructure and a military that wanted a reward for returning quietly to the barracks. The President moved quickly and retired hundreds of military officers holding political positions; established a blue-ribbon panel to investigate human rights violations, released scores of persons held without charge, and rescinded numerous questionable licenses and contracts left by the previous regimes. The government also moved to recover millions of dollars in funds secreted to overseas accounts.

Most civil society leaders and Nigerians witnessed marked improvements in human rights and freedom of the press under President Olusegun Obasanjo. As Nigeria works out representational democracy, conflicts persist between the Executive and Legislative branches over appropriations and other proposed legislation. A sign of federalism has been the growing visibility of State Governors and the inherent friction between Abuja and the State capitals over resource allocation (a document of the United States Department of State cited in Peter, 2012). Despite these challenges, Nigeria has remained a democratic State 19 years after the return of democracy in 1999. Nigeria has probably experienced disasters under the 19 years of civilian regime than all the post-independence military administrations. Beginning from the introduction of the Sharia law by the Muslim dominated extreme north that caused undue tension, deaths and destruction of properties in the country. This was swiftly followed by the Boko Haram insurgency that claimed over 13,000 people as at 2014 (Africa Check, 2014). This figure is increasing on a daily basis. The current figure of deaths occasioned by the activities of the insurgents group stands at about 51,567. The most devastating of all these that has recently made Boko Haram insurgency a child's play is the herders/farmers crisis that has placed the country on the steady path to food emergency as a result of the unprecedented destruction of lives and farms in most parts of the central region – the area that produced about 90 percent of the food needs of the country.

The argument therefore is that bulk of the arms used by these unpatrotic elements come into the country through the various points of entry. This implies that Nigeria's capacity to control arms influx, which is inevitable for purpose of putting the security concern under control will be futile without a more positive and robust engagement with her neighbours, both geographically, politically and economically.

Literature Review

There is general consensus on the nexus between globalisation and the escalation of transnational organised crimes (Adetula, 2014; Mackie, 2014; Peter & Asogwa, 2010; Peterside, 2018; Still, 2017). The porosity of the vast Nigerian borders is a core factor to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (CLEEN Foundation, 2015; Haas, 2006; Ibeanu, 2007; Kpughe, 2017; Peter & Asogwa, 2010; Peterside, 2018). The fact that no country can be an island a situation that has made mutual interdependency inevitable. The possibility and obvious reality of trans – border crimes in West Africa has hitherto frustrated the implementation of legal instruments needed for smooth interstate economic relation among countries within the West African subregion (Adeleye, 2017; Adepoju, 2015; Assanvo, Abatan, & Sawado, 2016; CLEEN Foundation, 2015; ECOWAS, 1999; Haas, 2006; Ike, 2012).

The roles played by the security agents have also contributed to the aggravation of the trans – border crimes. For instance, in the Seme border connecting Nigeria with Republic of Benin, several illegal roadblocks and the demand for gratification from security personnel (Ibeanu, 2007; Peter & Asogwa, 2010; Roberts, 2004) has constituted a core obstacle to legitimate transborder trade and economic activities. Illegal migration has been the major cause of insecurity in many parts of the world. For instance, it is argued that increased activities of smugglers across border areas alongside arms trafficking constitute a core challenge to the national security of countries with porous and unsecured borders (Goddy, John, Clement, & Oyindamola, 2017; Mobolaji & Alabi, 2017; Mobolaji & Alabi, 2017; Peter & Asogwa, 2010). Insurgency and other threats to domestic national security in Nigeria are offshoots of the spiralling cases of smuggling and trafficking of small arms and light weapons into Nigeria. Going by the established reality that what affects one area automatically affects other areas, it becomes imperative to examine the internationalisation of disaster as it affects Nigeria in this globalised age.

Theoretical Framework

This paper is anchored on the theory of linkage politics. According to Bow (2009:3), “linkages ... are efforts to break an impasse or otherwise improve one's bargaining position on a particular issue by tying it to another, unrelated issue”. He posits that “linkages can be cooperative or coercive, and they can be prospective (promises, threats) or retrospective (rewards, retaliation)” (Bow, 2009:3). Adele (2013:128) notes that, “linkage politics stresses the interdependence of domestic and international systems”. It explains the interconnectedness between domestic politics/policy and foreign policy. It has semblance with the principle of *intermestic* politics. According to Ajinde and Aleyomi (2014), “the two traditionally discrete realms, that is the domestic and international political arenas, have become fused into what is now called *intermestic* politics.” It explains the international relevance and interpretation of domestic affairs.

The concept of linkage was introduced by James N. Rosenau. Rosenau (1969) links domestic politics to international relations. He stated that linkage politics has its starting point from the systems analysis. Due to the growing interdependence among nations, a phenomenon that originates in a particular nation has a far-reaching effect on the global system, thereby steering up various reactions. To this end, Adele (2013) opines that “the Boko Haram activities in Nigeria continued to attract reactions beyond Nigeria.” The little respite from the attacks of Boko Haram has now been neutralised by the current ravaging by well-armed and militant herdsmen in many parts of the Nigeria's North Central Geopolitical Zone. The volume of destruction has made killing and destruction of properties in Nigeria an international affair. The utility of the linkage theory is premised on its capability to explain the trans-border movement of good and evil that has translated into the escalating dimension of evil and wanton destruction of life and property in Nigeria. The international interdependency among nation states has heightened the internationalisation of the international system with attendant positive and negative consequences. The theory of linkage politics will be robust in explaining domestic practices that help to minimise the negative consequences of the disasters that accompany internationalisation.

Results and Discussion

Trans-Border Movement of Persons and Goods

As a means of boosting the economic activities and mutual interdependency among countries within the West African sub-region, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed. The necessity of

forming a sub-regional economic organisation is to foster economic integration among countries in West Africa. According to Adepoju (2015), in reflection for similar organisations and institutions in advanced and developing countries. Among such organisations that influenced West Africa's decision are the European Economic Community; the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA); the Caribbean Community (CAICOM); the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); the Central American Common Market (CACM); cooperation agreements among African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, among others (Adepoju, 2015).

Consequent upon the following, Article 27 (Paragraph 1) of the ECOWAS treaty affirmed the need for economic integration, which includes free flow of persons, goods and services by calling on the Member States to ensure gradual removal of all obstacles to free movement of persons, services and capital (ECOWAS, 1999; Nwanolue & Iwuoha, n.d.). To a large extent, the basic reason for the formation of the Economic Community of West Africa States has been achieved going by its achievements in the restoration of peace and order in some troubled spots of West Africa. However, the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and Goods has suffered significant setback. It has significantly affected the economies of many West African countries. For instance, the West African Insight cited in Adepoju (2015) clearly states that;

A high proportion of cross-border movement in the sub-region is unrecorded due to the ubiquitous roadblocks across frontiers, the lengthy and costly formalities at border posts, and the corruption of officials. Thus, for example, for a radius of ten kilometres along the Nigerian side of the Lagos-Seme border, there are no fewer than twenty-five checkpoints during the daytime and many more at night, instead of the approved three checkpoints

These views are supported by Haas (2006). The activities of law enforcement agents at the border crossings have constituted a major stumbling block to the realisation of the ideals of the Protocols. This has defeated the possibly positive intention behind the inauguration of the protocol. Part of the illegal businesses is the use of Cotonou in Benin Republic to import cars into Nigeria. To this end, Ibeanu (2007:22) posits that "there is a booming car market in the outskirts of Cotonou, which is largely patronized by Nigerians, though most of the importers are Lebanese". This has resulted in the continual erosion of resources due Nigeria as the importers of the cars to Cotonou take the advantage of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and Goods to move them to Nigeria since most of those cars are bought by Nigerians.

Some of these challenges necessitated the difficulty in the implementation of the Protocols. The implementation of these declared protocols has been more on the breach (Roberts, 2004; Ibeanu, 2007). The general argument among scholars is that ECOWAS Protocols on the free movement of persons and goods have not been realistically and satisfactorily implemented due to the nonenforcement and non – establishment of related integrative Protocols, such as the ECOWAS Common Currency and Common Market (Edeh & Peter, 2008). The combination of these factors, have continued to frustrate the drive towards complete and mutually beneficial implementation of the Protocol.

Trans–Border Criminality

CSD (2010:160) submits that "organised crime involving migrants, in brief, remains a form of *pariah* organised crime". It reports that immigrant communities constituted safety zone for criminal organisations. Some of these criminal groups have become transnational in character and have operations in most of the global south countries. The modus operandi of these criminal elements is engaged in organised trans-border activities basing their headquarters in highly corrupt countries (CSD, 2010). The assertion therefore is that countries that are notorious for corruption automatically become safe ground for such illicit trade and economic activities to thrive. This occasioned the multiplicity of cheeking points and road blocks mounted by law enforcement agents at border crossings.

Trans–border criminality is itself responsible for the inability of West African countries to effectively implement the instrument of Free Movement of Persons. Ike (2012) submits that with international linkages and collaboration among some stakeholders interested in the illicit activities at the border crossings, the operational base of organized crime in Nigeria has widened beyond immediate frontiers. With this reality of spiraling trans-border criminality and the porosity of Nigeria's land borders and her immediate neighbours, Ibeanu cited in CLEEN Foundation (2015:12) submits that "the challenges of trans–border crimes support those calling for a protectionist approach to African borders".

Boko Haram Insurgency

The latest and probably most devastating dimension of insurgency in Nigeria is the recurrent unleash of terror by the Islamic militant group notoriously called Boko Haram (meaning western education is sacrilege) in most parts of northern Nigeria. What has often made the war against this group difficult is the ideological dimension underlying the operation of the group and the appeal of the ideology to the people who are predominantly Muslims. It is acclaimed to be a religious war, with emphasis is on the complete annihilation of western education, philosophy, and ideology; and the institutionalization of Arabic and Islamic education in at least twelve states in northern Nigeria.

Boko Haram activities according to the Africa Desk Factsheet, “has financed itself mainly through ransom kidnappings, bank robberies and other illegal activities”. The military has also been severally ambushed and striped of their arms by the insurgent’s group. There are allegations that some national and international collaborators are behind the financing of the activities of the dreaded insurgent group. Unlike the Niger Delta Militants, which is obviously a legitimate struggle for the control of the resources domiciled in their region and the struggle for the protection of their environment, the Islamic fundamentalists prosecuting the Boko Haram agenda have no genuine reason except the struggle for the establishment of another government that is religiously inclined within the broader Nigeria’s secular state. Nigerian flags were burned and strange flags hoisted in some places. This is treasonable and an act of rebellion against the authority of the Nigerian state and a test of the capacity of the Nigerian government to exert its sovereignty and maintain her territorial integrity.

Originating in the north-eastern part of Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency has been ongoing for the past nine years, rapidly spreading to other parts of the country as well as to a large portion of the Lake Chad Basin (Assanvo, Abatan, & Sawado, 2016). The devastating consequence of the activities by Boko Haram was alarming. The *modus operandi* of this terrorist group includes among other things, attacks on churches, their clergy, and their faithful through suicide bombings, gun attacks, kidnappings and rape (Kpughe, 2017). At a later of their operation, mosques (the Muslims’ worship centre) were attacked during prayers with the suicide bombers pretending to be fellow worshippers. Several deaths have occurred as a result of this strategy of the dreaded terrorist group. Beginning in Nigeria and exported to other countries within the Lake Chad Basin Commission is an indication of the rapid spread of evil across borders. The activities of Boko Haram has led to the death of more than 51,567 people and the displacement of about 2,400,000 people across the North – Eastern part of Nigeria between 2010 and 2016 when the activities of the group became widespread (IOM, 2016; The Telegraph, 2015; Africa Check , 2014; IDMC, 2018; Campbell, 2018; Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).



Figure 2: Destruction due to the activities of Boko Haram

Source: Accessed on 26th June, 2018 from

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/10878074/Hundreds-killed-in-massive-Boko-Haram-attack-in-northern-Nigeria.html>

Herders/Farmers Crisis

As Nigerians were about having a sigh of relief from the devastating activities, herders/farmers’ crisis began in basically central region of the country. The disaster of this is the impending food crisis in Nigeria.



Figure 3: A typical picture of an armed herder

Source: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/activities-of-fulani-herdsmen-worry-south-east-people/>. Accessed on 19th June, 2018

The upsurge of Fulani Herdsmen attacks on local farmers that have led to massive destruction of lives, properties and farmlands is possibly part of the negative consequences of the massive movement of small arms and light weapons across the borders of Nigeria and her neighbours. This monumental inflow of arms and other military hardware through the Nigeria's vast and porous land borders and the unsecured sea borders will continue to pose threat to domestic security of the country. In 2017 alone, an estimated number of 549 people lost their lives to the activities of Fulani Herdsmen with thousands of internally displaced persons. This has not abated. It is almost a daily occurrence in many parts of Nigeria at the moment. Between January and April, 2018, 901 people were killed in the North-Central Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria by Fulani Herdsmen (Chima, Okoh & Shiklam, 2018).

Apart from the sophistication that has become characteristic of the modern herders-farmers crises necessitating the use of sophisticated weapons that were hitherto alien to herders, Bello (2013:134) identifies some of the reasons for herders-farmers crisis to include:

overgrazing and unsustainable land for farming; theft of cattle and goats; destruction of crops; hardening of soils rendering them infertile and difficult when tilling for crop growing; physical fight with machetes and sticks; pollution of drinkable water; destruction of reservoirs and source of drinkable water; burning of rangelands, FADAMA and houses; and damages to irrigational facilities. The destruction has direct impact on the peoples' livelihood as their economic activities are tied to these environmental resources like water, land (soil), and vegetation (herbs and food crops).

The most recent attack of the herders on Jos leading to the death of about 200 people including women and children belong to a group popularly known as *Miyetti Allah*, has said that the massacre was retaliatory for the loss of 300 cows (Nanlong, Duru, Omonobi, & Una, 2018; Vanguard, 2018; Opejobi, 2018; Ajijah, 2018; Maina, 2018; Okeke, 2018). The irony is that in the Nigerian history, herdsmen are known to carry shepherd staff with which they control their cows. How have they become heavily armed? Who is responsible for the arms and ammunition used by these herdsmen and other militia and insurgent groups in Nigeria? The earlier these questions are answered, the better in addressing the rapidly increasing carnage in Nigeria.



Figure 4: Herders–Farmers’ crisis in Southern Kaduna

Source: <http://dailypost.ng/2018/03/05/herdsmen-attacks-fg-rebuild-destroyed-houses-southern-kaduna/>. Accessed 26th June, 2018

Beyond the Jos carnage, violence has engulfed almost all parts of the country. The latest dimension of it is the killing of scores of people, the displacement of about 7,000 people following an inter–communal crisis involving Ebonyi State in the South East Geopolitical Zone and Cross River State in the South–South Geopolitical Zone (Okutu, 2018). No region in Nigeria is free of violence necessitated by the wanton availability of small arms and light weapons. For instance, “the increased availability of illegal small arm and light weapons in Nigeria estimated to be in the range of 3 million is also attributed as a factor to the rise and proliferation of violent social formations” (Duruji, 2014:335). The aggregation of these challenges, that is Boko Haram insurgency in the North–East Geopolitical Zone, the re–emerging Niger Delta crisis in the South– South Geopolitical Zone, Herders–Farmers crisis in the North–Central Geopolitical Zone, the escalating kidnappings, communal crises, and armed robbery in the South–East and South–South Geopolitical Zones are all offshoots of the burgeoning small arms trafficking into Nigeria (Peter & Asogwa, 2010; Peterside, 2018).

These escalating crises are reflections of the level of poverty in Nigeria. For instance, the recent projection by the World Poverty Clock compiled by Brookings Institute poverty index indicates that Nigeria has overtaken India as the country with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty, with an estimated 87 million Nigerians, or around half of the country's population, thought to be living on less than \$1.90 per day (Adebayo, 2018; Eweniyi, 2017). These are key indicators of a failed state. There is a gradual erosion of the state’s ability to maintain internal security following daily blood letting and accelerated poverty coupled with the extremely high cost of living.

Disease Spread

This constitutes a major disaster occasioned by internationalisation. The spread of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) for instance in many countries of the world, especially West Africa is noteworthy in this light. The index case in Nigeria was a Liberian-American, Patrick Sawyer, who flew from Liberia to Nigeria's most populous city of Lagos on 20 July 2014. The air traveller had been exposed to EVD in Liberia, had symptoms during his journey, and died on July 25, 2014, after being admitted to a private hospital in Lagos (BBC, 2014; Althaus, Low, Musa, Shuaib, & Gsteiger, 2005; Information Nigeria, 2014). This called for stiffer control of the air travel system and an urgent need for adequate health screening at the point of entry through the airports. The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Health on hearing of another outbreak of the EVD in the Democratic Republic of Congo, put measure in place to prevent the re–occurrence of the Patrick Sawyer experience. “The Federal Ministry of Health has stepped up surveillance at all entry points into Nigeria to prevent the spread of Ebola disease into the country” (Owoseye, 2018).

Human Trafficking

Nigeria also is a major source, transit, and destination country for forced labour and sex trafficking (CIA, 2018). The growing wind of internationalisation has also aggravated the menace of human trafficking. For instance, Still (2017) notes that “increased globalization and refined trafficking techniques have established a strong trafficking route between Mexico and the United States”.

Human trafficking, essentially for sexual exploitation is part of the violation and abuse of women. As Meyersfeld (2016) notes by making reference to the various international conventions on this menace, this is

manifested in the mass rape of women during war time, the cutting of women's and girls' genitalia; and the trafficking of women and children which should be prominent in war times. The arbitrary treatment of the female gender; particularly the cutting of women's and girls' genitalia, trafficking of women for sexual purposes, has also achieved international recognition, condemnation and regulation. A number of factors have been identified as the reasons for prospering sexual industry, and conducive atmosphere for recruiting and trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation. These are transnational border space, commercial and human mobility, presence of organised crime network and a prevailing poverty level in the communities surrounding the border area (Adeleye, 2017). These factors are generally referred to as the disasters of internationalisation, which to a great extent influence the foreign policy of nation states.

Implication of these Disasters for Nigeria's Foreign Policy in a Global Age

A critical consideration of every foreign policy is the national interest of the state. Some scholars have equated national interest with national security. The primary concern of any state therefore is the national security of its people. Any state that failed in this area appears to have failed in everything. The components that made up national interest include security interests, economic interests and ideological interests. This paper focuses on the security interests as a component of national interest. The empirical indicators of security interests include; protecting national borders, ensuring the safety of citizens from harm by foreign enemies, protecting allies, protecting areas of military importance such as military supply routes, allies that host military bases, protecting bases and sources of national power preventing foreign intrusions into your national territorial regions, maintaining military power and capacity to project power where and as needed to protect national sovereignty and security interests, and maintaining knowledge regarding potential threats to national security.

The failure of the Nigerian state to guarantee the domestic security of her people occasioned by the spiralling activities of these militia and terrorist groups, which undermines the sovereignty and supremacy of the state and abrogates the notion of the state possessing monopoly of the use of force and has reduced the value of the state. Strong economies are able to also maintain a strong military that can address internal rebellion and external threats. For instance, it has been argued that, "American decision makers generally understand national security to be a military concept, but Japanese leaders perceive national security in economic terms" (Knecht and Weatherford cited in Breuning, 2007:65). The combination of both the military concept and economic concern is plausible as the capacity of a country militarily and economically is imperative in her efforts at curbing the activities of these militia groups have frustrated legitimate state institutions in the provision of domestic security.

Historically, Nigeria's external "relations in West Africa is guided by a policy of good neighborliness" (Adetula, 2014:10). The obvious reality is that the relationship between Nigeria and other countries within the West African sub – region has always occupied a central place in the consideration of Nigeria's national security and external relations. In fact, Nigeria has long pursued the Afrocentric posture in her foreign policy drive. This good neighbourliness and the doctrine of Africa as the centre – piece of Nigeria's foreign policy has not yielded much positive results for the following reasons. Firstly, Nigeria and most of the sub-Saharan African countries are producers of primary goods. To this end, trade relationship between Nigeria, her immediate neighbours and Africa at large is limited. Secondly, the doctrine of good neighbourliness occasioning the acceptance and domestication of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of people and goods across the borders of West African countries has accentuated the free movement of criminal elements whose activities have accelerated violent conflicts in many parts of Nigeria. For instance, Adetula (2014:11) reports that the media is awash with evidences that have "implicated some migrants from neighbouring West African countries in civil disturbance, urban and rural violence, theft, armed robbery and general insecurity of lives and property". The inevitable and rational implication of this is that Nigeria ought to maintain a tighter relationship with her neighbours in a bid to forestall further escalation of violent conflicts across the country. The illegal inflow of arms to Nigeria from other neighbouring countries like Benin republic, Chad and Niger republics demands that Nigeria tightens the national security component of her foreign policy. Its usual implication is the abrogation or violation of the protocol on free movement of people and goods across the borders of countries within the West African sub-region. Crude oil prospecting by the Nigerian government around the Lake Chad is equally used as one of the reasons for the escalation of hostile relationship between Nigeria and other members of the Lake Chad Commission.

Despite the catalogue of evidences that necessarily should be reasons for hostile foreign policy towards Nigeria's neighbours, a foreign policy anchored on cooperation is inevitable in this already globalized world with rapid internationalization of disaster manifested in the form of money laundering, human trafficking, arms

smuggling, among others. In fact, Adetula (2014:19) reaffirm that “West Africa and other regions of continental Africa are experiencing new forms of violence whose causes have become associated with contemporary globalization.” Therefore, it becomes obsolete to contemplate existing in isolation. Besides, going by the Boko Haram terrorism that originated from a small enclave in Maduguri, the Borno State Capital, later spread to other parts of the state, other states in Nigeria and Abuja – the Federal Capital Territory, and subsequently the neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad Republic, among others; the mayhem currently being unleashed on Nigerians basically across the North Central Geopolitical Zone by herders. It is hoped that adequate surveillance can be done to minimise the negative effect of international disasters on Nigeria and other countries within the international milieu. Adequate positive collaboration between the countries in the international system, like the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising units, mostly military, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It is headquartered in N'Djamena and is mandated to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency (William, Abatan, & Sawadogo, 2016). It is also important to note that in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency, positive engagement of civil society organization, among others can help.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Globalisation has come to stay. The results of this study show that the current global reality has made all countries of the world to share common fate. Despite that internationalisation has numerous positive consequences in countries of the world, the negative effects are also numerous. The study therefore revealed that destructive natural disasters that have occurred in recent times affected many countries of the globe; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons have been seen to be responsible for the escalating violent conflicts in Nigeria such as the Boko Haram insurgency, Niger – Delta terrorism, Herders/Farmers crises, communal crises among others. It therefore adduces that;

- i). Friendliness, instead of hostility is the way forward for countries of the world,
- ii). Bilateral and/or multilateral collaborations are inevitable in the handling of disasters. For instance, the raging of Boko Haram that cuts across many countries in West Africa,
- iii). Nigeria can work harder in ensuring border security
- iv). There is urgent need for disarmament and demilitarisation, as a way of controlling the spread of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria.

This will help to forestall the immigration of criminal elements and the smuggling of contraband goods such as cannabis, cocaine, small arms and light weapons, which is partly responsible for the continual escalation of violent conflicts across the country, among others. In a nutshell, cooperation between Nigeria and the bordering countries is inevitable in the handling of the proliferation and illegal inflow of arms that have become the panacea for violent conflicts in Nigeria. Collaboration and cooperation is most needful rather than confrontation and undue assertiveness in addressing the common enemy of Nigeria and her immediate neighbours.

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